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ABSTRACT 
  In the United States’ system of separation of powers, the judiciary 
must safeguard the rights of individuals from abuses by the political 
branches of government. Yet, when it comes to matters touching 
foreign affairs, scholars such as John Yoo and jurists such as Antonin 
Scalia argue that the executive branch is entitled to virtually 
unreviewable discretion. They point to Navy v. Egan for support. 
There, the Court held that an administrative body that hears appeals 
from adverse actions against government employees was precluded 
from reviewing the merits of security clearance determinations 
because the executive branch deserves “super-strong” deference in 
foreign affairs. An examination of the disastrous consequences of 
Egan crystallizes the constitutional and functional arguments against 
“super-strong” deference to the executive—both in foreign affairs 
generally and in the security clearance process specifically.  
  The case has prompted lower courts to deny plaintiffs an 
independent forum in which to bring constitutional claims related to 
security clearance denials and revocations. Egan’s progeny flouts the 
longstanding principle that an individual who suffers a constitutional 
injury is entitled to an appropriate remedy. Furthermore, by abdicating 
its duty to check executive power in the security clearance context, the 
judiciary has fortified deficiencies inherent to executive agency 
decisionmaking, namely tunnel vision, path dependency, and 
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imperialist tendencies. Abdication has also enabled a systematic 
denial of clearances to candidates with foreign connections. Without a 
diverse counterterrorism workforce, the United States lacks the 
operational proficiency and the legitimacy to wage a successful war 
on terrorism.  
  This Note is the first to call on the judiciary to reclaim the right to 
exercise judicial review of the merits of security clearance 
determinations. Furthermore, it charts a path for lower courts to 
reopen judicial review of the merits of security clearance 
determinations, provide injured plaintiffs with a remedy, deter future 
racial discrimination, and avert a chilling effect on agency 
decisionmakers.  
INTRODUCTION 
Tucked inside Justice Antonin Scalia’s scathing dissent in the 
landmark case of Boumediene v. Bush1 lies a passing reference2 to 
Department of the Navy v. Egan.3 Egan holds a special place in the string 
citations and law review footnotes of conservative jurists because it 
fortified the constitutional and functional pillars propping up the 
executive branch’s purported entitlement to “super-strong” deference in 
foreign affairs.4 In Egan, the Court held that the Merit Systems 
Protection Board, an administrative body created to hear appeals from 
adverse actions against government employees, was precluded from 
reviewing the substance of security clearance determinations in the 
absence of express congressional authorization because the executive 
branch deserves the “utmost deference” in conducting foreign affairs.5 
Constitutionally, this executive entitlement allegedly derives from the 
president’s status as commander-in-chief.6 Functionally, the executive 
branch is said to have structural advantages that make it uniquely 
 
 1. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
 2. Id. at 2297 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Indeed, we accord great deference even when the 
President acts alone in this area. See Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529–30 (1988); 
Regan v. Wald, 468 U. S. 222, 243 (1984).”). 
 3. Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988). 
 4. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme 
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 
1083, 1100–01 (2008) (describing “super-strong” deference in foreign affairs as the strongest 
form of deference courts can invoke). 
 5. Egan, 484 U.S. at 529–30 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974)). 
 6. Id. at 527. 
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competent to address problems related to foreign affairs.7 This Note will 
demonstrate how, ironically, the destructive consequences of Egan itself 
demonstrate that the edifice supporting super-strong deference to 
executive power rests on defective foundations. 
When the government issues a security clearance, it has determined 
that an individual is fit to access classified information.8 The best 
estimates suggest that at least 2.5 million positions across executive 
agencies require security clearances.9 To obtain a security clearance, 
candidates must complete a three-stage process: application, 
investigation, and adjudication.10 There have been longstanding 
criticisms about the efficiency and quality of the process. In a recent 
report on the topic, the House of Representatives Intelligence 
Committee summarized these criticisms.11 It found that the process 
continues to be plagued by Cold War attitudes and technology; lengthy 
delays and substantial backlogs; discrepancies in approach among 
agencies and the absence of quality metrics; and an unhealthy focus on 
applicants’ foreign family members and associates, which has weeded 
out many applicants with Middle Eastern backgrounds, language skills, 
and expertise.12 Recent statutes and executive orders have remedied 
some of these problems, but overall the process continues to be stuck in 
“layers and layers of planning.”13 The stunningly sparse legal scholarship 
on judicial review of security clearance determinations consists of two 
student works, one calling for the legislative branch to authorize limited 
judicial review14 and one calling on the executive branch to do the same.15 
This Note is the first to call on the judiciary to reclaim, on its own, the 
right to exercise judicial review of the merits of security clearance 
 
 7. Id. at 529; Julian Ku & John Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for 
Foreign Affairs Deference to the Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 201–02 (2006) 
(noting that executive agencies “possess greater expertise over a complex and technical 
statute.”). 
 8. Exec. Order No. 12,968, 3 C.F.R. 391 (1995), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 435 (2006). 
 9. SILVESTRE REYES, PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, SECURITY 
CLEARANCE REFORM—UPGRADING THE GATEWAY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
COMMUNITY, H.R. REP. NO. 110-916, at 4 (2008). 
 10. Id. at 5. 
 11. Id. passim. 
 12. Id. at 7–10. 
 13. Id. at 20. 
 14. David C. Mayer, Note, Reviewing National Security Clearance Decisions: The Clash 
Between Title VII and Bivens Claims, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 786, 813 (2000). 
 15. William H. Miller, Note, A Position of Trust: Security Clearance Decisions After 
September 11, 2001, 14 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 229, 253 (2004). 
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determinations and thus provide a necessary check on executive power 
in the security clearance process. Contrary to the thinking of jurists like 
Justice Scalia16 and scholars like John Yoo,17 this Note will argue that 
constitutional and functional considerations weigh heavily against super-
strong deference to the executive—both in foreign affairs generally and 
in the security clearance process specifically. To properly critique the 
drawbacks of super-strong deference and the benefits of judicial review, 
this Note will address in depth the problem of racial and national origin 
discrimination in the security clearance process. 
Part I of this Note lays out the nuts and bolts of the security 
clearance process. Part II addresses the constitutional pillar upholding 
super-strong deference. Section A explains why super-strong 
deference fails to respect the Constitution’s separation-of-powers 
scheme by disregarding checks and balances. Section B then 
demonstrates the “constitutional blasphemy”18 that Egan and super-
strong deference have wrought in lower courts, which has left 
plaintiffs who have racial discrimination claims arising from security 
clearance revocations without a forum. 
Part III addresses the second pillar propping up super-strong 
deference: the functional claim that executive agencies are 
comparatively more competent than courts to tackle legal issues 
implicating foreign affairs.19 Bureaucratic decisionmaking is 
characterized by rigid adherence to standard operating procedures. In 
the absence of oversight, which courts are usually in a strong institutional 
position to conduct, the resulting policies are frequently dysfunctional. 
By abdicating its duty to check agency power in the security clearance 
context, the judiciary has fortified a system that makes Americans less 
safe. Specifically, the judiciary has enabled a systematic denial of 
clearances to candidates with foreign connections, depriving the United 
States of the operational skill and the legitimacy to wage a successful war 
on terror. 
Part IV will show how lower courts can, consistent with existing 
Supreme Court precedent, reopen independent judicial review of the 
merits of security clearance determinations to adjudicate a plaintiff’s 
 
 16. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 17. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 18. See Bernard Schwartz, A Decade of Administrative Law: 1987-1996, 32 TULSA L.J. 493, 
551 (1997) (using these words to characterize Justice Scalia’s dissent in Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 
592 (1988), which counseled against providing a forum for plaintiffs raising sexual orientation 
discrimination as a constitutional violation arising from security clearance revocations). 
 19. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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equal protection constitutional claims. The Part then suggests ways in 
which courts can make plaintiffs whole. Professor Walter Dellinger 
drew a helpful distinction between using the Constitution as a 
“shield” and as a “sword” to provide injured plaintiffs with a remedy 
for constitutional violations.20 To draw on the Constitution as a shield 
is to stop the government from inflicting injury, utilizing equitable or 
injunctive relief to block impermissible government behavior.21 To 
use it as a sword is to wield it for an affirmative purpose, finding that 
the Constitution itself authorizes a cause of action and damage 
remedy against the government’s officers.22 This Part argues that 
lower courts can and should feel free to employ both remedies when 
confronted with colorable equal protection claims arising out of an 
adverse security clearance determination. Finally, this Part will shed 
light on how to deter future discriminatory agency rulings and avoid a 
chilling effect on agency adjudicators. 
I.  DEMYSTIFYING THE SECURITY CLEARANCE PROCESS 
When the government issues a security clearance, it has determined 
that an individual is fit to access classified information.23 Although 
comprehensive statistics are unavailable, the best estimates suggest that 
at least 2.5 million positions across executive agencies in the areas of 
national defense, homeland security, and foreign policy require security 
clearances.24 Classified information is divided into three levels based on 
its “sensitivity,” or the level of harm that its disclosure would inflict on 
national security: Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret.25 There are three 
corresponding levels of security clearances.26 
To obtain a security clearance, candidates must complete a three-
stage process: application, investigation, and adjudication.27 The first 
stage involves completing an application form, which asks for essential 
background information, such as where the candidate has lived, attended 
school, and traveled, as well as more personal information related to the 
 
 20. Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. 
REV. 1532, 1532 (1972). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Exec. Order No. 12,968, 3 C.F.R. 391 (1995), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 435 (2006). 
 24. REYES, supra note 9, at 4. 
 25. Id. at 4–5. 
 26. Id. at 5. 
 27. Id. 
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candidate’s criminal history, financial situation, and drug or alcohol use.28 
In the second stage, the investigation, agency investigators gather in-
depth information about a candidate in a series of standard areas, 
through such means as agency database checks and field interviews of a 
candidate’s neighbors.29 Even after receiving a clearance, one must 
undergo periodic reinvestigations.30 
The third stage, adjudication, entails the relevant agency 
reviewing the results of the investigation to render a determination of 
fitness for a security clearance.31 The overriding standard is that a 
clearance may only be granted when it is “clearly consistent with the 
interests of national security.”32 A series of thirteen decision points 
are used as baseline criteria to render this judgment, ranging from 
“[f]oreign preference” and “[a]llegiance to the United States” to 
“[f]inancial considerations” and “[s]exual behavior.”33 Through a 
process known as the “whole person concept,” adjudicators weigh 
weaknesses in these areas against mitigating factors to make a holistic 
evaluation of the candidate.34 For example, dual citizenship is 
considered a weakness under the “[f]oreign preference” category, but 
can be mitigated if the dual citizenship is due to parents’ citizenship 
or birth in a foreign country and if the individual expresses a 
willingness to renounce foreign citizenship.35 Doubts about a 
candidate’s fitness are to be resolved in favor of national security.36 
 
 28. Id. at 9. The form is known as Standard Form (SF)-86. Id. at 5. 
 29. COUNCIL ON SEC. & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, INTELLIGENCE & NAT’L SEC. 
ALLIANCE, IMPROVING SECURITY WHILE MANAGING RISK: HOW OUR PERSONNEL SECURITY 
SYSTEM CAN WORK BETTER, FASTER, AND MORE EFFICIENTLY 1, 21 (2007), available at 
http://www.insaonline.org/assets/files/INSA-WPaper-Version%202.pdf. Since 2005, the Office of 
Personnel Management has led investigations on behalf of the vast majority of agencies, 
including the Department of Defense, whose uniformed, civilian, and industry personnel hold 
more security clearances than any other agency. Agencies within the Intelligence Community, 
whose personnel hold approximately 10 percent of clearances, as well as the Department of 
Homeland Security and Department of State, conduct their own investigations. REYES, supra 
note 9, at 5–6. 
 30. REYES, supra note 9, at 5. Those with Top Secret clearances are reinvestigated every 
five years, those with Secret clearances every ten years, and those with Confidential clearances 
every fifteen years. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified 
Information, 32 C.F.R. § 147.2 (2008). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See id. § 147.5 (listing the criteria and mitigating factors for making determinations related 
to the foreign preference category). 
 36. Id. § 147.2. 
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When clearances are denied or revoked, candidates may request an 
appeal in which they are entitled to certain procedural safeguards, 
including notice as to the decision’s justification, a reasonable 
opportunity to respond, outside counsel, and the opportunity to cross-
examine individuals who have made adverse statements about the 
candidate related to an issue underlying the security clearance 
determination.37 
Within these parameters, the precise nature of the adjudicative 
process varies agency by agency.38 The Department of Defense’s (DoD) 
process for federal government contractors can be considered 
representative.39 After an initial adverse decision by the Defense Office 
of Hearing and Appeals (DOHA), the candidate is given a Statement of 
Reasons (SOR) underlying the decision and may request a DOHA 
hearing before an administrative judge.40 The DoD must furnish the 
candidate with the evidence that will be presented to substantiate the 
allegations in the SOR.41 At the hearing, both sides present their cases to 
the judge and the candidate is able to present witnesses and other 
documented evidence to rebut the reasons underlying the adverse 
security clearance determination.42 The judge then applies the national 
security standard to reach a decision.43 Both parties can appeal the 
decision to a three-judge DOHA appeals board.44 The board’s standard 
of review is highly deferential to the hearing.45 The board is principally 
charged with ensuring that the findings of fact were “supported by such 
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate” and 
that the decision was not “arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.”46 The 
standard of review is worded similarly to the Administrative Procedure 
 
 37. Exec. Order No. 10,865, 3 C.F.R. 398 (1959–1963) (promulgated Feb. 20, 1960), 
reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C. § 435 (2006). The Executive Order was issued in the 
aftermath of Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959), in which the Court held that candidates 
were entitled to the “safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination” in the absence of 
express authorization stating otherwise from the president or Congress. Id. at 508. 
 38. Miller, supra note 15, at 235. 
 39. Id. 
 40. 32 C.F.R. pt. 155 app. A (2008). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id.; see also Sheldon I. Cohen, Appeal Board Decisions of the Defense Office of 
Hearings and Appeals: Are They Arbitrary and Capricious? 3–4 (July 2006), 
http://www.sheldoncohen.com/publications/DOHA%20Appeal%20Board%20Decisions,%20 
Sec.%2002s1.pdf (characterizing the level of review authorized as very limited in scope). 
 46. 32 C.F.R. pt. 155 app. A. 
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Act (APA),47 which authorizes federal courts of appeals to review 
agency actions.48 A striking difference from the APA, however, is that 
the DOHA appeals board is not authorized to review for “abuse of 
discretion.”49 They are also not authorized to review the facts de novo.50 
II.  EGAN AND ITS PROGENY AS CONSTITUTIONAL BLASPHEMY 
This Part lays bare the inherent defects of the constitutional pillar 
upholding super-strong deference to executive power and stresses the 
importance of the judiciary supplying adequate remedies for 
constitutional wrongs. Section A will draw on the reasoning of Egan to 
show that the failure of super-strong deference to account for checks and 
balances represents a corrupt understanding of the Constitution’s 
separation of powers. Section B will show that the courts of appeals, 
when confronted with plaintiffs raising constitutional claims not 
presented by Egan, have relied on the super-strong deference canon to 
foreclose review of the merits of adverse security clearance 
determinations. 
A.  Egan and the Constitutional Pillar Supporting Super-Strong 
Deference 
In Egan, the Court found that the Constitution demands super-
strong deference to the executive on matters touching foreign affairs.51 
 
 47. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–06 (2006). 
 48. See id. § 702 (“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action . . . is entitled to 
judicial review thereof.”). 
 49. Compare 32 C.F.R. pt. 155 app. A (allowing review to determine whether the “rulings 
or conclusions are arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law”), with 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) 
(authorizing the reviewing court to hold unlawful actions that are “arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”). 
 50. Compare 32 C.F.R. pt. 155 app. A (limiting the reviewing court to deferential review of 
the Administrative Judge’s findings, review of procedure, and review for “arbitrary [and] 
capricious” rulings), with 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F) (establishing that “[i]n 
making . . . determinations, the court shall review the whole record” and may overturn rulings 
based upon factual determinations “subject to trial de novo”). 
 51. See Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988) (“The authority to protect 
[classified] information falls on the President as head of the Executive Branch and as 
Commander in Chief.”); Eskridge & Baer, supra note 4, at 1101 (cataloging various deference 
paradigms and placing Egan within its “super-strong” deference paradigm). The most famous 
case to articulate super-strong deference to the executive was United States v. Curtiss-Wright 
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), which held that “congressional legislation . . . within the 
international field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from 
statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved.” Id. at 
320. 
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Importantly, the Court had a range of less deferential standards at its 
disposal, embodied in cases such as Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer,52 Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,53 and Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc.54 Yet the Court chose to invoke super-
strong deference, alleging that the standard was derived from the 
Constitution’s separation of powers and declaration that the president is 
“Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.”55 In 
fact, the Court said that the foreign affairs arena is to be considered the 
“province and responsibility of the Executive.”56 Moreover, the ability to 
classify and control access to intelligence represents a power inherent to 
the executive, existing “quite apart from any explicit congressional 
grant.”57 The practical implication of this super-strong deference, then, is 
that courts should grant “the utmost deference” to the executive in 
matters involving foreign affairs, resisting encroachment unless Congress 
expressly authorizes otherwise.58 In light of this vision, the Court in Egan 
held that the Merit Systems Protection Board, an administrative body 
created to hear appeals from adverse actions against government 
employees, could not review the substance of security-clearance 
 
 52. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Youngstown “rejected 
the . . . vision of unrestrained executive discretion in favor of a normative vision of the policy-
making process in which the three branches of government all play integral roles.” HAROLD 
HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-
CONTRA AFFAIR 112–13 (1990). 
 53. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). Instead of reflexively granting deference, 
the Skidmore standard calls on courts to evaluate an executive agency’s interpretation for the 
“thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with 
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if 
lacking power to control.” Id. at 140. 
 54. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The 
Chevron standard dictates that unless the legislative branch has directly addressed the 
interpretative issue, then a court must defer to an executive agency’s reasonable interpretation 
of a statute that it administers. Id. at 842–43. On the continuum of deference standards, Chevron 
can be considered only marginally more scrutinizing than super-strong foreign affairs deference. 
See Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 783–85 (2004) 
(describing how the application of Chevron to agency preemption of state law claims has 
enabled agency insensitivity to federalism concerns). For calls to apply Chevron deference in 
foreign affairs, see Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 
649, 725–26 (2000); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 
116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1227–28 (2007). For a thoughtful critique of applying Chevron in foreign 
affairs, see Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE 
L.J. 1230, 1282–83 (2007). 
 55. Egan, 484 U.S. at 527 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1). 
 56. Id. at 529 (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 293–94 (1981)). 
 57. Id. at 527. 
 58. Id. at 530 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974)). 
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determinations because it was not expressly authorized by statute to do 
so.59 
Egan’s pronouncement of sweeping executive power and call for 
super-strong deference represents a superficial and flawed view of the 
separation of powers. To understand why, one must take a step back to 
gain a better grasp of the purpose and architecture of the Constitution. 
The Framers divided the government into branches to diffuse power and 
guard against tyranny.60 The structure of the document confirms this 
purpose by embedding a notion of checks and balances.61 That is, it 
generally grants branches the authority to carry out functions that check, 
and are checked by, the other branches. For example, a plain reading 
shows that the Constitution distributes powers related to foreign affairs 
across the branches, rather than vesting those powers exclusively in the 
executive.62 The Constitution assigns authority to Congress to regulate 
international commerce, form and maintain armed forces, and declare 
war.63 Furthermore, courts are vested with the authority to adjudicate all 
cases and controversies properly brought before them.64 As Chief Justice 
 
 59. Id. at 518. 
 60. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 756 (1996) (“Even before the birth of this 
country, separation of powers was known to be a defense against tyranny.”); Youngstown Sheet 
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The purpose of the 
Constitution was not only to grant power, but to keep it from getting out of hand.”); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 321–22 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (stating that “the 
great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department 
consists in giving . . . each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives 
to resist encroachments of the others”); Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing 
Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 289, 316 (1995) (“Functions are separated to avoid amassing 
undue governmental power, to protect against governmental tyranny.”). 
 61. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957) (“The prohibitions of the Constitution 
were designed to apply to all branches of the National Government and they cannot be nullified 
by the Executive or by the Executive and the Senate combined.”). 
 62. See Jonathan I. Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 
805, 806 (1989) (arguing that the Constitution confers foreign affairs powers across the 
branches). 
 63. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Some scholars argue that the Article II Vesting Clause provides 
the executive branch with a sweeping grant of foreign affairs power, limited only by the powers 
specifically listed elsewhere in the Constitution. See, e.g., Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. 
Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 254 (2001) (“Foreign 
affairs powers not assigned elsewhere belong to the President, by virtue of the President’s 
executive power; while foreign affairs powers specifically allocated elsewhere are not 
presidential powers, in spite of the President’s executive power.”). The text and history of the 
Vesting Clause, however, suggest that this interpretation is untenable. Curtis A. Bradley & 
Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 
551–52 (2004). 
 64. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, 
Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 937–44, 975–76 (1988) (arguing 
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John Marshall said in Marbury v. Madison:65 “The very essence of civil 
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the 
protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.”66 Nowhere does 
the Constitution hint that the judiciary’s obligation ends when a matter 
touches foreign affairs.67 In fact, if courts were to abdicate their duty, the 
separation of powers scheme would be threatened as the courts mutated 
into a “partner in the transgressions of the political branches, instead of a 
bulwark between them and the individuals who sought the Court’s 
protection.”68 
This latter point deserves special emphasis, especially when an 
individual is seeking judicial protection from a constitutional violation. It 
is widely recognized that a chief function of the judiciary is to supply 
adequate remedies for constitutional wrongs.69 In accord with this 
 
that the text of these provisions and the values they represent require federal appellate review 
of constitutional issues decided by administrative agency adjudications). 
 65. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 66. Id. at 163. The Court quoted this language favorably in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), in which it, for the first time, 
inferred a legal entitlement to damages against individual federal officers directly under the 
Constitution. Id. at 397. Professor Curtis Bradley, who argues for a deferential Chevron canon 
in foreign affairs, has characterized the position advocating greater judicial scrutiny in foreign 
affairs as the “Marbury perspective.” Bradley, supra note 54, at 665. It bears mentioning that 
proponents of super-strong deference also cite John Marshall, referencing a statement he 
delivered while serving in the House of Representatives in which he asserted that “[t]he 
president is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations and its sole representative with 
foreign nations.” See, e.g., John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1639, 1679 (2002) (quoting 10 Annals of Congress 613–14) (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1851)); 
see also id. (pointing to Marshall’s statement as evidence of the executive branch’s purported 
plenary power in foreign affairs). There, however, Marshall was addressing a specific dispute 
concerning the president’s power to execute U.S. obligations under an extradition treaty and 
“not making any claim about unspecified substantive powers.” Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 
63, at 549 n.19. 
 67. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“Whatever power the 
United States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or 
with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three 
branches when individual liberties are at stake.”); Charney, supra note 62, at 807 (“[T]he 
Constitution does not exclude or limit the courts’ authority in cases or controversies touching on 
foreign relations.”). 
 68. Bandes, supra note 60, at 320; see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 638 (2006) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (“Concentration of power puts personal liberty in peril of 
arbitrary action by officials, an incursion the Constitution’s three-part system is designed to 
avoid.”); Charney, supra note 62, at 807 (“Furthermore, matters with foreign relations 
implications may involve the legal rights and duties of individuals or the states under federal law 
clearly within the courts’ authority. Judicial deference or abstention in such cases may 
compromise the authority of the federal courts.”). 
 69. Bandes, supra note 60, at 294; Fallon, supra note 64, at 956; see also THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (stating that the 
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venerable principle, the Court has applied the constitutional avoidance 
canon70 to statutes that appear to strip courts of their jurisdiction to 
review violations of individuals’ fundamental constitutional rights.71 That 
is, courts make every effort to construe such statutes to avoid the serious 
constitutional doubts that would be raised by denying plaintiffs judicial 
review for colorable constitutional claims.72 Because the original 
constitutional structure should be harmonized with the contemporary 
explosion of the administrative state, it is particularly important to 
preserve judicial review when executive agencies deprive individuals of 
their rights.73 One scholar has gone so far as to say that an agency action 
that precludes judicial review of constitutional claims amounts to 
“constitutional blasphemy.”74 Precluding review, the argument goes, 
would extend a “standing invitation” to agencies to exceed their powers 
 
“independence of the judges is . . . requisite to guard the Constitution and the rights of 
individuals from the effects of those ill humors which . . . the influence of particular 
conjunctures[] sometimes disseminate[s] among the people themselves”); Akhil Reed Amar, Of 
Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1486 (1987) (“[T]hat every person should have a 
judicial remedy for every legal injury done him was a common provision in the bills of rights of 
state constitutions; [and] was invoked by The Federalist No. 43 in a passage whose very 
casualness indicated its uncontroversial quality . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 70. “Known colloquially as the avoidance canon, it is most commonly described as 
providing that ‘where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious 
constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such a 
construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.’” Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional 
Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1192 (2006) (quoting Edward J. 
DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)). 
 71. See Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 361 (1974) (permitting a conscientious objector 
who had performed alternative service to challenge a federal statute that excluded conscientious 
objectors from a veterans’ benefits program even though the statute specified that no court had 
the power to review decisions of the Veterans Administration related to the program); Henry P. 
Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 258 (1985) (“At this point in 
our history I would be startled to see the Court decide that a litigant pressing a bona fide 
constitutional claim could be denied access to the independent judgment of a judicial forum.”). 
 72. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (“[A] ‘serious constitutional 
question’ . . . would arise if a federal statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a 
colorable constitutional claim.” (quoting Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 
667, 681 n.12 (1986))). 
 73. See McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 480 (1991) (referencing the 
Court’s “well-settled presumption favoring interpretations of statutes that allow judicial review 
of administrative action”); Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Presumption of Reviewability: A Study in 
Canonical Construction and Its Consequences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 743, 755 (1992) (noting that 
judicial review was “part of a constitutional quid pro quo: courts would decline to employ the 
nondelegation doctrine to overturn statutes and, in return, courts would preserve the power to 
review agency decisions”); Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and 
the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1612–13 (2000) (describing the history 
and constitutional importance of preserving judicial review in the administrative law context). 
 74. Schwartz, supra note 18, at 551. 
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and violate constitutional norms because there would be no independent 
check on their actions.75 
A principal concern with granting super-strong deference to the 
executive on foreign affairs, then, is that it may put the judiciary on a 
collision course with the equally strong presumption of judicial review of 
constitutional claims.76 If confronted with a choice between the two 
presumptions that the Court did not have to face, lower courts may feel 
compelled to take the passive course of action out of sheer ease, 
deferring to political branch power.77 There is evidence that this is 
precisely what happened to Egan’s progeny. When lower courts mixed 
Egan’s super-strong deference to the executive with the tangled 
relationship among constitutional, statutory, and administrative 
remedies relating to racial discrimination, the remarkable result was 
complete foreclosure of judicial review for plaintiffs in relation to 
security clearance revocations. 
B.  Egan’s Progeny and the Foreclosure of All Remedies for Racial 
Discrimination Claims 
Although Egan only barred an administrative board from reviewing 
the substance of security clearance determinations involving statutory 
claims, its sweeping language about deference to the executive, and 
accompanying presumption against judicial review absent congressional 
authorization, has compelled lower courts to defer in even constitutional 
claims implicating security clearances. 
Lower courts have weaved together two separate threads of 
precedent to deny a forum to plaintiffs asserting racial discrimination in 
security clearance revocations.78 The first thread of cases stands for the 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. 
REV. 689, 730–31 (1990) (describing how the Court employs “a superstrong presumption against 
preclusion of constitutional claims”). 
 77. This behavior is consistent with the judiciary’s historical practice in foreign affairs. See 
THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW 
APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? 159 (1992) (“[W]hen judges do decide the cases brought to 
challenge a foreign policy, it may safely be assumed . . . that they would reach out in an effort to 
agree with the story told by the president's experts. In all but the most egregious instances, they 
would find a challenged presidential action constitutional and legal.”). 
 78. Other commentators have described the foreclosure of judicial review as well. See 
Mayer, supra note 14, at 788–91 (identifying the fact that courts generally refuse to hear security 
clearance decision challenges on Title VII grounds); Miller, supra note 15, at 246 (examining how 
Egan and Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820 (1976), combine to foreclose 
Title VII claims). 
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proposition that when Congress has crafted a comprehensive remedial 
scheme, plaintiffs are denied access to other statutory and constitutional 
remedies. These cases developed as a reaction to Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,79 which held that a 
plaintiff could seek money damages from individual federal officers for 
violating the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches 
and seizures.80 Bivens was groundbreaking because the Court, for the 
first time, inferred a legal entitlement to damages against individual 
officers directly under the Constitution.81 The Court subsequently 
extended Bivens to find causes of action for violations of plaintiffs’ due 
process and equal protection rights under the Fifth Amendment.82 Since 
then, however, the Court has retreated by building expansively on two 
exceptions to constitutional liability articulated in dicta in Bivens: 
1) when there are “special factors counseling hesitation” and 2) when 
Congress has enunciated an equally effective substitute.83 In subsequent 
cases, the Court has collapsed the two exceptions into one to hold that 
the existence of a statutory remedial scheme, even if decidedly inferior to 
that which would be provided by a Bivens action, represents a special 
factor counseling hesitation and precludes constitutional liability.84 
Another case, Brown v. General Services Administration,85 which failed 
to reference Bivens, nevertheless has played an integral role in 
precluding Bivens actions, because it held that Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 196486 supplies the exclusive remedy for racial 
discrimination in federal employment law.87 
Lower courts have taken this first thread concerning remedial 
preclusion and combined it with a second thread of cases, enshrined in 
Egan, which calls on courts to defer to the executive branch on matters 
 
 79. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971). 
 80. Id. at 397. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248–49 (1979). 
 83. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396–97; see also Bandes, supra note 60, at 297–98 (describing the 
expansion of the two exceptions). 
 84. See, e.g., Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388 (1983) (ruling that the Civil Service Reform 
Act provided the sole remedy for a federal worker claiming First Amendment violations and 
defamation after he was demoted allegedly in retaliation for public statements critical of his 
agency); see also Perry M. Rosen, The Bivens Constitutional Tort: An Unfulfilled Promise, 67 
N.C. L. REV. 337, 357–61 (1989) (listing the cases narrowing Bivens’ scope). 
 85. Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820 (1976). 
 86. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-16 (2006). 
 87. Brown, 425 U.S. at 835. 
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pertaining to foreign affairs.88 Although Egan addressed only an 
administrative review board’s authority to review the merits of security 
clearances, lower courts have applied its super-strong deference to the 
executive to find that there can be no judicial review of the merits of 
security clearance determinations absent express congressional 
authorization.89 Title VII, which under Brown provides the sole avenue 
of recourse for racial discrimination in the federal government,90 has 
been interpreted to lack such an authorization.91 Weaving these two 
threads together, then, forecloses judicial review of prospective plaintiffs’ 
claims that require reaching the merits of security clearance 
determinations. The circuit courts have been unanimous in following this 
reasoning.92 
The logic of Egan’s progeny is suspect in light of Webster v. Doe,93 
decided just four months after Egan. In Webster, a former Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) electronics technician was terminated 
pursuant to Section 102(c) of the National Security Act of 1947, which 
authorizes the Director of the CIA to terminate the employment of any 
employee at his discretion.94 Doe produced statements by his superiors 
suggesting that his security clearance was revoked and his job terminated 
because the CIA saw his homosexual orientation as posing a threat to 
 
 88. See, e.g., Perez v. FBI, 71 F.3d 513, 515 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that the 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the plaintiff’s Title VII and Bivens claims 
related to security clearance revocation). 
 89. See infra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 90. Brown, 425 U.S. at 828–30. 
 91. See, e.g., Becerra v. Dalton, 94 F.3d 145, 149 (4th Cir. 1996) (declining to adjudicate the 
plaintiff’s racial discrimination claims because there was “no unmistakable expression of 
purpose by Congress in Title VII to subject the decision of the Navy to revoke Becerra’s 
security clearance to judicial scrutiny”). Alternatively, some courts have declared that judicial 
review of the merits of security clearance determinations would run afoul of Title VII’s national 
security exception. See, e.g., Cruz-Packer v. Chertoff, 612 F. Supp. 2d 67, 70 (D.D.C. 2009) 
(declining to review the plaintiff’s sexual discrimination claims because 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(g) 
sanctions the termination of “an employee if ‘the occupancy of such position . . . is subject to 
any requirement imposed in the interest of the national security of the United States under any 
security program . . . [and] such individual has not fulfilled or has ceased to fulfill that 
requirement.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(g))). 
 92. Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 218 (3d Cir. 2008); Bennett v. Chertoff, 425 F.3d 999, 
1000 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1134, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003); Tenenbaum v. 
Caldera, 45 Fed. App’x 416, 418 (6th Cir. 2002); Becerra, 94 F.3d at 148–49; Weber v. Buhrkuhl, 
No. 95-2554, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 36114 (8th Cir. Dec. 21, 1995) (per curiam); Perez, 71 F.3d 
at 515; Brazil v. Dep’t of the Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 196–98 (9th Cir. 1995); Hill v. Air Force 844 
F.2d 1407, 1409 (10th Cir. 1988); Romero v. Dep’t of Defense, 527 F.3d 1324, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
 93. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988). 
 94. Id. at 595. 
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national security.95 Doe presented statutory and constitutional claims 
related to the alleged employment discrimination.96 Because Title VII 
prohibits discrimination only on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and 
national origin, and not sexual orientation,97 Doe fell outside its purview. 
The Court held that Doe’s statutory claims under a provision of the 
APA98 were precluded by another APA provision that foreclosed 
judicial review of “agency action . . . committed to agency discretion by 
law.”99 The APA, however, did not preempt Doe’s constitutional 
claims.100 The Court declared that there was a strong presumption in 
favor of judicial review of constitutional claims that could be overcome 
only by express congressional authorization denying such review.101 It 
invoked the constitutional avoidance doctrine in support of this position, 
noting that a “‘serious constitutional question’ . . . would arise if a federal 
statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a colorable 
constitutional claim.”102 Importantly, the Court rejected the CIA’s 
argument that judicial review would involve inappropriate “‘rummaging 
around’103 in [its] affairs,” finding that lower courts could effectively 
balance the plaintiff’s need for access to evidence “against the 
extraordinary needs of the CIA for confidentiality and the protection of 
its methods, sources, and missions.”104 
The perplexing result of Egan and Webster is that plaintiffs claiming 
racial discrimination have no access to judicial review of the merits of 
security clearance determinations (because Title VII provides the 
exclusive remedy and fails to reach security clearance determinations 
under Egan’s progeny). Victims of sexual orientation discrimination, 
conversely, can have courts review the merits of colorable constitutional 
claims (because sexual orientation falls outside of Title VII and 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 596. 
 97. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-16 (2006). 
 98. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006). Webster charged that the agency action violated the APA 
because it was arbitrary and capricious. Webster, 468 U.S. at 596. 
 99. Webster, 468 U.S. at 597 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706). 
 100. Id. at 603 (rejecting petitioner’s claim that unconstitutional policies are unreviewable 
under the APA). 
 101. Id. (“[W]here Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims, its 
intent to do so must be clear.” (citing Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 373–74 (1974))). 
 102. Id. (quoting Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12 (1986)). 
 103. Id. at 604 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Webster, 468 U.S. 592 (No. 86-
1294)). 
 104. Id. 
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constitutional claims enjoy their own favorable presumption).105 In other 
words, a statute drafted to afford heightened protection to certain groups 
offers them less protection than groups that fall outside of its purview in 
this context.106 This discrepancy reflects deep tensions in the reasoning 
underpinning the two cases. In other contexts in which Bivens actions 
would ordinarily be foreclosed by a statutory scheme, but the specified 
alternative has proven inadequate, circuit courts have drawn on Webster 
to reopen a cause of action directly under the Constitution.107 
III.  EGAN AND JUDICIAL ABDICATION TO INSTITUTIONAL 
INCOMPETENCE: THREATENING NATIONAL SECURITY 
In a string of cases related to the war on terror, the Court has 
refused to find that the executive is constitutionally entitled to super-
strong deference in foreign affairs.108 Indeed, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,109 
only Justices Scalia and Thomas signed on to this proposition,110 whereas 
 
 105. Other commentators have described this perplexing outcome as well. See Mayer, supra 
note 14, at 788–91; Miller, supra note 15, at 246. 
 106. Mayer, supra note 14, at 788–91; Miller, supra note 15, at 246. 
 107. See Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees Local 1 v. Stone, 502 F.3d 1027, 1035–39  (9th Cir. 
2007) (drawing on Webster to hold that Transportation Security Administration security 
screeners alleging retaliation in violation of their First Amendment rights were entitled to seek 
equitable relief); Czerkies v. Dep’t of Labor, 73 F.3d 1435, 1440–41 (7th Cir. 1996) (relying on 
Webster to hold that a federal employee denied workers’ compensation by an administrative 
body was entitled to Article III judicial review of his constitutional due process claim). Part IV 
of this Note will explain why courts should build on this precedent to revisit the current 
approach to judicial review of security clearances, reopening the option for Bivens actions 
against federal officers who violate plaintiffs’ equal protection rights under the Fifth 
Amendment. 
 108. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2271–77 (2008) (invalidating as 
unconstitutional the statute that stripped federal courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus 
petitions of accused noncitizen enemy combatants held at Guantanamo Bay); Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006) (declaring military commissions unlawful because they 
violated the Geneva Convention); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (plurality 
opinion) (holding that an American citizen enemy combatant was entitled to due process 
protections); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004) (holding that federal courts have 
jurisdiction under the federal habeas statute to hear challenges to detention raised by detainees 
held at Guantanamo Bay). 
 109. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 110. See id. at 718–19 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Our duty to defer to the President’s 
understanding of the provision at issue here is only heightened by the fact that he is acting 
pursuant to his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and by the fact that the subject 
matter of Common Article 3 calls for a judgment about the nature and character of an armed 
conflict.” (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936))); see 
also Eskridge & Baer, supra note 4, at 1185 (“[O]nly two Justices invoked Curtiss-Wright 
deference in Hamdan, where it would seem to have been applicable.”). 
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the dissenters in Boumediene left it unstated altogether. The latest trend 
has been for those advocating deference to do so on functional 
grounds,111 contending that the executive branch has several built-in 
advantages that make it better fit to handle such matters.112 Section A 
will show that these arguments rest on a set of optimistic and ultimately 
misguided assumptions about agency decisionmaking—which, when left 
unmonitored, is plagued by tunnel vision, path dependency, and 
imperialist tendencies. Although courts should avoid micromanaging 
agency tasks, Section B will demonstrate that they are well positioned 
institutionally to spot and correct glaring deficiencies inherent to agency 
decisionmaking. Finally, Section C demonstrates that judicial abdication 
in the context of security clearance revocations threatens the country’s 
national security by leaving flaws endemic to agency decisionmaking 
unchecked. 
As a first order matter, it is imperative to point out that perceived 
comparative policy advantages should take a backseat to courts’ 
constitutional duties to adjudicate matters properly brought before them 
and safeguard the rights of individuals from the political branches.113 In 
 
 111. See Ku & Yoo, supra note 7, at 181 (arguing that deference to agency interpretations 
has a strong functional basis); cf. Paul F. Diehl & Tom Ginsburg, Essay, Irrational War and 
Constitutional Design: A Reply to Professors Nzelibe and Yoo, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1239 passim 
(2006) (pointing out that Professors Nzelibe and Yoo, having lost their constitutional 
arguments, have turned to functional arguments to justify deference to the executive in 
warmaking powers). 
 112. Professor H. Jefferson Powell has argued for executive primacy in foreign affairs by 
melding the constitutional and functional arguments. H. Jefferson Powell, The President's 
Authority over Foreign Affairs: An Executive Branch Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527, 
547–48 (1999). He asserts that the Framers conceived of the executive branch as the best 
equipped to address issues arising in the foreign affairs arena and designed the Constitution 
accordingly. Id. Nevertheless, contemporary deference proposals must still harmonize these 
animating sentiments of the Founders with the unforeseen expansion of the administrative state. 
See Deborah N. Pearlstein, Form and Function in the National Security Constitution, 41 CONN. 
L. REV. 1549, 1551–55 (2009) (reconciling the Founders’ functionalist views of separation of 
powers in foreign affairs with contemporary realities); Young, supra note 73, at 1612–13 
(describing the history and constitutional importance of preserving judicial review in the 
administrative law context). Because the Founders retained checks and balances over a compact 
executive in foreign affairs, it is consistent with Powell’s interpretation of their intentions to 
allow judicial oversight over the actions of unelected agency officials when they deprive 
individuals of equal protection under the law. See discussion supra Part II.A. This argument is 
especially true when doing so produces better policy outcomes. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 113. Bandes, supra note 60, at 302 (describing the fundamental duties of courts to adjudicate 
cases properly brought before them and check the power of the political branches in the 
separation-of-powers system). Some scholars go so far as to say that all administrative judicial 
actions must be reviewable by Article III courts. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of 
the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1246–48 (1994) (“Article III requires de novo 
review, of both fact and law, of all agency adjudication that is properly classified as ‘judicial’ 
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particular, when an executive agency’s actions violate an individual’s 
constitutional rights, that individual is entitled to an appropriate remedy 
in an independent judicial forum.114 Even assuming, arguendo, that 
courts are not constitutionally obliged to remedy such violations, the 
functional arguments in favor of across-the-board deference to the 
executive are misguided. 
A.  The Institutional Drawbacks of Executive Agencies 
Supporters of super-strong deference invoke, either implicitly115 or 
explicitly,116 what political scientists term a “rational choice model” that 
idealizes executive agencies by imputing supreme rationality and 
expertise to their decisionmaking. That is, advocates presume that 
agency workers operate by weighing costs and benefits of proposed 
courses of action and choosing the optimal one.117 In doing so, they 
accumulate vast expertise in their area of practice, which was already a 
prerequisite for the job.118 When it comes to foreign affairs specifically, 
the view of advocates is that the relevant agencies, unlike courts, are 
“solely focused on designing and implementing foreign policy” and, as a 
result, possess expertise that makes them better suited to address legal 
 
activity.”). This Note does not make that argument because the Framers’ intent can be honored 
by providing an “adequately searching” system of appellate review, rather than a 
comprehensive system that would compromise the efficiency of agencies and saddle courts with 
an unworkable docket. See Fallon, supra note 64, at 918 (defending an “adequately searching” 
system of Article III review of administrative adjudications). A meaningful system of judicial 
review would have to include review of an agency’s alleged deprivation of an individual’s 
constitutional rights. See id. at 975–76 (stating that it would be “highly disturbing” if Congress 
precluded Article III judicial review of constitutional rights violations because of concerns 
related to separation of powers and fairness to the litigants). Although it is beyond the scope of 
this Note to flesh out the other elements of an “adequately searching” system of Article III 
judicial review of agency adjudications, a sound baseline standard can be found in Skidmore, 
which calls on courts to evaluate an executive agency’s interpretation for the “thoroughness 
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to 
control.” Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); see also Mendelson, supra note 54, 
at 797–98 (describing the benefits of a Skidmore approach over a Chevron approach in the 
context of federal preemption of state law claims). 
 114. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 115. See Ku & Yoo, supra note 7, at 201 (treating agencies as unitary, rational actors). 
 116. Cf. Glenn Sulmasy & John Yoo, Challenges to Civilian Control of the Military: A 
Rational Choice Approach to the War on Terror, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1815 passim (2007) 
(employing a rational choice model to understand the behavior of military lawyers). 
 117. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 54, at 1207 (“The normative question is whether the 
executive’s institutional expertise gives it advantages over courts in this setting as it does in the 
Chevron setting, and the answer is surely yes.”). 
 118. Ku & Yoo, supra note 7, at 202. 
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issues that arise in the implementation of their mandates.119 This 
approach proved persuasive in Egan, in which the Court invoked the 
comparative institutional advantage of executive agencies to support its 
holding.120 Noting that the decision to grant or deny security clearances 
involves a multitude of factors that make it “an inexact science at best,” 
the Court went on to say that this judgment is best reserved for “those 
with the necessary expertise in protecting classified information.”121 The 
Court stated further that outside bodies certainly could not conduct risk 
analyses and assess acceptable margins of error with any confidence.122 
As such, the judgments of executive agencies could not be second-
guessed.123 
There is a strong pedigree of support in political science literature 
that the rational choice paradigm invoked by supporters of deference is 
inappropriate for understanding agency decisionmaking. In their 
groundbreaking book Essence of Decision, political scientists Graham 
Allison and Philip Zelikow supply an alternative “organizational 
processes” model that captures the intricacies of agency decisionmaking 
and should be used to interrogate claims concerning the relative 
institutional competency of courts and agencies.124 Agencies are formed 
to carry out desirable and complex government functions, such as 
protecting the environment or analyzing sensitive information about 
foreign threats.125 The complexity of the functions requires mass 
coordination, which is best executed by “dividing labor, specializing 
according to function, and training members of the organization to 
perform in routine fashion.”126 Agencies, then, are like the pin factory 
analyzed by Adam Smith, where an individual (unfamiliar to the 
industry) acting alone could produce perhaps a single pin in a day, while 
a small factory of ten workers who divide and specialize their labor could 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. See Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988). 
 121. Id. (quoting Adams v. Laird, 420 F.2d 230, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1969)). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. GRAHAM ALLISON & PHILIP ZELIKOW, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE 
CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 143–96 (2d ed. 1999). 
 125. Id. at 145. 
 126. Id. 
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produce tens of thousands.127 Thus, agencies, by establishing standard 
operating procedures, create capabilities otherwise unimaginable.128 
The nature of agencies, however, also makes them susceptible to 
three principal problems: tunnel vision, path dependency, and imperialist 
tendencies. Tunnel vision refers to the behavior of bureaucrats who 
diligently comply with their specialized standards of procedures without 
regard for broader public policy goals or, at times, for the agency’s 
original mission.129 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), for 
instance, has tended to allocate resources toward eliminating even the 
most marginal risks associated with an identified hazardous waste site, 
instead of using some of those resources to pinpoint and mitigate more 
significant environmental risks.130 
Tunnel vision leads to path dependency, or the tendency of agencies 
to stick to a course of action because it is familiar, rather than optimal.131 
When a bureaucrat confronts a novel problem or receives new 
responsibilities from an external mandate, he or she will not look to 
serve the purposes or values of external actors, but will assimilate the 
new with the letter or logic of old procedures.132 In the process of 
assimilating, the bureaucrats will not canvass a range of options and 
choose the optimal course of action.133 Instead, they will stop with the 
first method that seems good enough.134 The result is frequently 
dysfunctional as “unduly formalized, sluggish, or inappropriate” 
procedures persist beyond any usefulness.135 
 
 127. Id. (referencing ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS 2–3 (Edwin Cannon ed., Random House 1937) (1776)). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 156 (“Not norms and values but taken-for-granted scripts, rules, and 
classifications are the stuff of which [organizations] are made.” (quoting Paul J. DiMaggio & 
Walter W. Powell, Introduction, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL 
ANALYSIS 1, 15 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991))). 
 130. Mendelson, supra note 54, at 781 (referencing STEPHEN G. BREYER, BREAKING THE 
VICIOUS CIRCLE 11–13 (1993)). 
 131. ALLISON & ZELLIKOW, supra note 124, at 149. 
 132. Id. at 149, 156 (“Having chosen their instruments in the circumstances of the past, they 
are confined by them as they encounter new circumstances in the future.”). 
 133. Id. at 155–56 (describing how agencies employ a logic that emphasizes compliance with 
procedures, rather than producing favorable consequences). 
 134. In the parlance of organizational theory, this phenomenon is known as “satisficing.” Id. 
at 152, 171; see also HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 118–20 (4th ed. 1997) 
(defining the characteristics of the “satisficing administrator”). 
 135. ALLISON & ZELIKOW, supra note 124, at 170. Professors Allison and Zelikow go on to 
note that “[a] program, once undertaken, is not dropped at the point where objective costs outweigh 
benefits. Organizational momentum carries it easily beyond the loss point.” Id. at 180. 
RATHOD IN FINAL 2 11/12/2009  11:21:38 PM 
616 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:595 
Agencies’ imperialist tendencies, or the propensity to seek greater 
resources and responsibilities unnecessarily, also present problems.136 
Because “[m]ost organizations define the central goal of ‘health’ as 
synonymous with ‘autonomy,’”137 agencies invariably strive for larger 
budgets, personnel, and areas of operation, rather than realistically 
assess whether they need greater resources or are best equipped to jump 
into new territory.138 Consequently, important policy decisionmaking 
often becomes bogged down in turf battles among agencies with 
overlapping missions. An agency may prevail arbitrarily and at the 
expense of sound public policy.139 
B.  The Judiciary Is Positioned to Monitor and Remedy Flaws in 
Agency Decisionmaking 
The point of the foregoing discussion is to question the idealized 
understanding of executive agency competence invoked by deference 
proponents and, concomitantly, to counsel against an across-the-board 
deference regime on matters pertaining to foreign affairs.140 Proponents 
of deference properly point out that even if agency decisionmaking is 
prone to problems, the appropriate inquiry is whether courts can do a 
better job at resolving the relevant legal issues without creating greater 
costs.141 There is, in fact, a strong functionalist case that the benefits of 
judicial review—allowing a fully independent body with experience 
interpreting the law across various fields to check the power of executive 
agencies prone to dysfunctional decisionmaking—outweigh the costs—
allowing that body to decide a matter without technical expertise in the 
field.142 
 
 136. Id. at 181. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See, e.g., id. (referencing an incident in World War II when Japanese diplomatic codes 
were broken, an interagency battle over control ensued, and the powerful, but ill-equipped, 
Naval War Plans Division “won the right to ‘interpret and evaluate’ [the intelligence] . . . [but] 
[t]he results for the U.S. government were not good” (footnote omitted)). 
 140. Although this critique principally applies to the advocates of super-strong deference, it 
can also be extended to those who press for other all-encompassing, highly deferential regimes 
such as Chevron deference in foreign affairs. For a discussion of Chevron, see supra note 54. 
 141. See Ku & Yoo, supra note 7, at 202. 
 142. See Jinks & Katyal, supra note 54, at 1262 (“Presidents are nearsighted in a way that 
other government actors are not, particularly the judiciary, which tends to be farsighted.”). 
Although Professors Jinks and Katyal are critical of deferential regimes in foreign affairs and 
stress the strengths of the judiciary, they also speak highly of bureaucracies. Their analysis could 
be strengthened by accounting for the deficiencies in agency decisionmaking that occur absent 
judicial oversight. As mentioned above, independent judicial review of all agency judicial 
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The judiciary has great institutional strength. Courts daily put into 
practice the famous John Marshall maxim that “[i]t is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”143 In 
saying what the law is, courts serve adjudicative and structural checking 
functions.144 First, they serve as an independent forum that neutrally 
interprets and applies the law to determine whether the plaintiff before 
them claiming injury is entitled to relief.145 Second, they serve as a check 
on the political branches of government by seeing that they stay within 
the confines of their constitutionally granted powers.146 Typically, judges 
are generalists who carry out these functions across a wide array of 
fields, often implicating highly technical and complex issues.147 Though 
they may not gain expertise in a particular area of law, it is fair to say 
that they do accrue expertise in a set of skills that includes “figuring out 
statutory purpose and harmonizing applications of statutes with legal 
and constitutional principles.”148 Importantly, this skill is the one judges 
must draw on to evaluate whether an agency’s actions violate 
constitutional rights. 
As mentioned, it is true that judges do not possess technical 
expertise in foreign affairs, but neither this fact, nor the other reasons 
that purportedly make foreign affairs distinct, warrant abdication. As 
with complex questions of domestic law, judges can rely on “their 
personal experience . . . prior decisions of other judges, scholarly 
writings, codifications of the law and the opinions of experts” to draw 
informed conclusions.149 Furthermore, just as with any other area of law, 
there is no reason to doubt that the adversarial system will produce the 
necessary factual information to render judgment.150 As the Court 
articulated in Webster, district court judges have sufficient tools at their 
disposal, such as the option of in camera proceedings,151 to ensure an 
 
actions would likely prove counterproductive, but an “adequately searching” system of 
appellate review would preserve Article III values and produce better policy outcomes. See 
supra note 113. 
 143. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 144. Bandes, supra note 60, at 303. 
 145. Id. at 303–07. 
 146. Id. at 311–20. 
 147. Charney, supra note 62, at 809. 
 148. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 164 (1994). 
 149. Charney, supra note 62, at 809. 
 150. Id. at 810. 
 151. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 604 (1988). Section 4 of the Classified Information 
Procedures Act authorizes courts to permit the government to submit materials to be inspected 
by the court alone. See 18 U.S.C. app. § 4 (2006) (“The court may permit the United States to 
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adequate factual record and safeguard the methods, sources, and 
missions of even the top intelligence agency.152 
Perhaps most importantly, the nature of executive agencies, in 
which job duties are segmented and workers strictly adhere to standard 
operating procedures, may not give agencies an appreciable advantage in 
area expertise over courts after all. Judge Richard Posner, for example, 
has asked proponents of deference (who have, tellingly, failed to answer) 
to clarify why “so-called ‘specialists’ who don’t live up to the name (think 
only of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, which repeatedly in 
the cases that come before [federal courts] displays its ignorance of 
foreign countries) forfeit the deference of reviewing courts?”153 Political 
scientists have argued powerfully that an executive agency’s purported 
area of expertise does not warrant a regime of deference, because the 
benefit of providing an independent check on its power actually 
strengthens decisionmaking by promoting deliberation.154 Judges, who 
have a trained eye for seeing how a particular issue fits within a larger 
policy and constitutional framework, possess distinct competence to 
remedy and call attention to constitutional violations arising from the 
tunnel vision, path dependency, and imperialist tendencies that are 
endemic to agency decisionmaking. As Judge Posner has said, “[t]he 
courts’ institutional position, allowing judges to see particular 
applications that legislatures cannot anticipate in advance, puts them in 
an especially good place to correct absurd applications.”155 
 
make a request for [relief from discovery] in the form of a written statement to be inspected by 
the court alone.”). Several courts have utilized ex parte, in camera proceedings in cases 
implicating classified information. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hara, 301 F.3d 563, 568 (7th Cir. 
2002) (affirming the district court’s use of ex parte, in camera proceedings to discern whether 
classified information was discoverable). 
 152. Webster, 468 U.S. at 604. 
 153. Richard A. Posner, Reply: The Institutional Dimension of Statutory and Constitutional 
Interpretation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 952, 964 (2003); see also Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian 
Vermeule, A Reply to Posner, 101 MICH. L. REV. 972 (2003) (failing to reply to Posner’s central 
critique of their work concerning agency expertise). 
 154. Diehl & Ginsburg, supra note 111, at 1254 (“As a polity moves farther away from 
consensus and checks and balances, success rates diminish and other harmful effects ensue.”). 
 155. Posner, supra note 153, at 968 (quoting CASS SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND 
POLITICAL CONFLICT 182–84 (1996)). 
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C.  The Security Clearance Process: Immunization from Judicial 
Review and the Fortification of Executive Agencies’ Institutional 
Incompetence 
In Egan and its progeny, judges have insisted that courts defer to 
the “institutional expertise” of the executive agencies in making security 
clearance determinations.156 With 2.5 million jobs requiring security 
clearances, it is true that executive agencies hold the potential to 
streamline the security clearance process by maximizing efficiency and 
limiting costs. In the absence of oversight, however, executive agencies 
have turned the security clearance process into a bureaucratic nightmare, 
plagued by dramatic deficiencies in efficiency and quality. The quality 
problems in particular are products of agencies’ unchecked tunnel vision, 
path dependency, and imperialism. In short, the security clearance 
process was developed at the onset of the Cold War and the quirks of 
executive agencies have compelled them to cling to the technology, 
procedures, and attitudes for guarding classified information in a war 
that the United States is no longer fighting. For instance, a failure of 
policymakers to account for the tunnel vision of adjudicators has created 
a system of perverse incentives, encouraging them to systematically deny 
and revoke security clearances of candidates with even the most tenuous 
foreign connections.157 The flawed system has significantly impeded the 
United States’ capacity (by depriving the federal government of those 
with critical foreign language skills and cultural expertise) and legitimacy 
(by alienating the communities most likely to come forward with critical 
information) to successfully carry out operations in the war on terror. 
The institution most capable of spotting and remedying these 
deficiencies in the agency adjudicative system—the judiciary—has 
abdicated its duty to check agency power and, consequently, has fortified 
a system that makes Americans less safe. 
1. Efficiency.  Although the problems with quality in the security 
clearance process will be the focus of this Section, issues concerning 
agencies’ efficiency bear mentioning as well. There are two primary 
efficiency concerns: backlog and agency reciprocity. First, the security 
 
 156. See, e.g., Perez v. FBI, 71 F.3d 513, 515 n.6 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (“‘Predictive 
judgments of this kind’ properly are left to ‘those with the necessary expertise in protecting [the 
sensitive material,]’ rather than in the hands of ‘an outside nonexpert body’ or the equally 
nonexpert federal courts.” (quoting Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988))). 
 157. See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 02-04786 (Defense Office of Hearing and Appeals June 27, 
2003) (finding that a female applicant with a single estranged family member overseas was 
vulnerable to coercion and, consequently, unfit for a security clearance). 
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clearance process has been plagued by lengthy delays and backlog for 
at least twenty-five years.158 The problems persist. A 2004 General 
Accounting Office report, for example, found that DoD had a 
backlog of 270,000 investigations and 90,000 adjudications.159 On 
average, it took the DoD 375 days to process contractors’ 
clearances.160 These lengthy delays have negative repercussions: the 
most qualified candidates often seek employment elsewhere, and 
critical posts can go unfilled for months on end.161 
Second, although the government sets forth baseline guidelines for 
the security clearance process, quality metrics have traditionally varied 
greatly agency by agency.162 As a result, many agencies are reluctant to 
bring on a federal employee or contractor with a clearance from another 
agency without first undergoing their own extensive investigation and 
adjudication.163 The lack of reciprocity poses significant barriers in a 
world where protecting against terrorist threats requires sharing 
information and connecting the dots among agencies. 
The political branches appear committed to improving the security 
clearance system’s efficiency, even if the results of reform have been 
somewhat mixed. In 2004, Congress passed and the president signed the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA),164 which 
contained a slew of provisions designed to centralize and streamline the 
process.165 Since IRTPA’s enactment, the president has also issued two 
executive orders166 fleshing out guidelines to further reform structure and 
advance the security clearance process. The reforms have improved 
timeliness, though a lack of reciprocity persists.167 The latter problem 
results mostly from agencies’ imperialist tendencies. According to the 
ranking member of the House Subcommittee on Intelligence 
Management, Darrell Issa, “[t]he problems with security clearance 
reform do not seem to be ones of money or even ideas. The real issues 
 
 158. REYES, supra note 9, at 7. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. COUNCIL ON SEC. & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, supra note 29, at 1, 8. 
 162. REYES, supra note 9, at 8. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 
Stat. 3638. 
 165. 50 U.S.C. § 435b (2006). 
 166. Exec. Order No. 13,381, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,953 (June 27, 2005); Exec. Order No. 13,467, 
73 Fed. Reg. 38,103 (June 30, 2008). 
 167. REYES, supra note 9, at 3. 
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seem to be stubbornness and a refusal to embrace system-wide efficiency 
over agencies’ proprietary desire to control the clearance process.”168 
2. Quality.  “If you didn’t come over on the Mayflower, you can’t 
get a clearance.”169 Notably, none of the recent reforms take aim at 
the deep-seated quality problems in the security clearance process. 
Indeed, the Democratic chair170 and the Republican ranking 
member171 of the House Subcommittee on Intelligence Management, 
as well as the former Director of National Intelligence,172 have all 
criticized the status quo for needlessly excluding individuals from 
critical communities and have stated a desire for a more diverse 
federal workforce. But none of them has introduced meaningful 
reform. Perhaps these and other political leaders are reluctant to 
tinker with a process they do not fully grasp. Yet, there is mounting 
evidence that agencies’ tendency toward path dependency and tunnel 
vision impedes the quality of the national security clearance process. 
First, there is a pronounced problem of path dependency, 
particularly in the investigative and adjudicative stages. The system was 
hatched at the onset of the Cold War and remains tethered to that 
bygone era.173 Perhaps field investigations made sense in the 1940s when 
neighborhoods were more closely knit and investigators could credibly 
glean intimate details bearing on a candidate’s credibility from 
neighbors.174 In today’s increasingly mobile society, field investigations 
 
 168. Id. at 20. 
 169. Stan Crock, If You Didn’t Come over on the Mayflower, You Can’t Get a Clearance, BUS. 
WK., Feb. 2, 2004, at 54, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/ 
04_05/b3868083.htm. 
 170. See Security Clearance Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intelligence 
Community Management of the Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 110th Cong. 1 (2008) 
(statement of Rep. Eshoo, Chairwoman, Subcomm. on Intelligence Community Management) 
(“[W]e tended to exclude people who had relatives overseas. This meant that our Intelligence 
Community was not very diverse. Today we need people who can blend this all over the 
world.”). 
 171. See id. at 3 (statement of Rep. Issa) (“[W]e should not assume that individuals’ 
allegiances are suspect simply because they have friends or family in the Middle East.”). 
 172. See Walter Pincus, Incoming Intelligence Chief Plans to Ease Hiring of Arabs, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 7, 2007, at A15 (citing then-Navy Vice Admiral John M. McConnell’s commitment 
to discard outdated security clearance procedures and hire more first-generation Arab-
Americans). 
 173. See COUNCIL ON SEC. & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, supra note 29, at 11 (“Thirteen of 
the fourteen ‘decision points’ currently used to evaluate if a candidate is eligible for a security 
clearance are vestiges of the system created in the 1940s. Since then, society, our ways of 
communicating, and perhaps the reasons why individuals spy have changed.”). 
 174. Id. 
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involving subjective or outmoded questions (such as “Does the applicant 
drink a lot?” or “[D]oes the applicant live within his means?”)175 are 
likely to yield either blank stares or incredibly varied responses.176 
Neither is particularly useful for determining fitness to access classified 
information. 
In the adjudication stage, thirteen out of the fourteen decision 
points used today to evaluate a candidate’s fitness are remnants of the 
original Cold War system.177 There was no hard evidence at the time that 
these decision points represented the optimal criteria for assessing a 
candidate’s suitability to access sensitive information. Today, there 
would seem to be even less reason to cling to the criteria given that 
“society, our ways of communicating, and perhaps even the reasons why 
individuals spy have changed.”178 Adjudicators have applied three of 
these decision points, “allegiance to the United States,” “foreign 
preference,” and “foreign influence,”179 to deny or revoke en masse 
security clearances for candidates with foreign connections.180 There are 
unquestionable justifications underpinning these decision points, but 
they can nevertheless be used merely as a pretext for discrimination. The 
allegiance criterion ensures that a candidate charged with safeguarding a 
nation’s most important secrets has unwavering loyalty to the United 
States.181 It can, however, be invoked to disqualify an individual who has 
tenuous associations with individuals or groups who have purportedly 
expressed hostility to the United States.182 The foreign influence criterion 
ensures that a close family member or strong financial interest overseas 
cannot be leveraged as pressure to reveal sensitive information to a 
hostile entity.183 It can, however, be invoked to disqualify a candidate 
solely because family members live abroad, even when they are 
estranged and the candidate exhibits unwavering fidelity to the United 
 
 175. Id. at 5, 11. 
 176. See id. at 11 (referencing the questions from the Cold War era that are still used today). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 14. 
 179. 32 C.F.R. § 147.2 (2008). 
 180. For a discussion of “tunnel vision,” see infra text accompanying notes 185–87. 
 181. 32 C.F.R. § 147.3. 
 182. Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 218 (3d Cir. 2008) (refusing to reach the merits of a 
Department of Transportation security clearance adjudication that revoked plaintiff’s security 
clearance because of undefined ties to associates in Egypt). 
 183. 32 C.F.R. § 147.4. 
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States such that there is no reason to believe that he or she would 
compromise national security out of personal interest.184 
Another key quality impediment is tunnel vision, which is the 
primary explanation for adjudicators’ systematic denial or revocation of 
security clearances for those with foreign ties. Recall that adjudication is 
the final stage of the clearance process, so an adjudicator, particularly an 
appeals adjudicator, is the last line of defense against a spy or otherwise 
unfit candidate handling sensitive information.185 If the adjudicator signs 
off on the clearance request of a candidate who eventually engages in 
traitorous activity, then superiors can readily pin blame on that 
adjudicator with damaging consequences sure to follow. Under this 
ominous cloud, adjudicators, in all probability, view their duty as rigidly 
policing the decision points to safeguard against even marginal risks. In 
the wake of the traumatizing terrorist attacks carried out on 
September 11, 2001, one would expect their eye for suspect information 
to have become sharper, resulting in a greater rate of denial. For 
example, when a concern is raised about a candidate under the 
allegiance to the United States, foreign preference, and foreign influence 
criteria,186 an adjudicator would presumably have a strong, perhaps 
irrebuttable, institutional bias against granting the candidate a clearance. 
Importantly, per the “organizational processes” model, one would not 
expect an adjudicator to consider that broader agency goals, such as 
recruiting from critical communities, may be impeded by rigid 
application of the decision points—especially when they are not 
incorporated into the rules and standards she is to apply, agency officials 
never tell her to consider them, and there is no judicial review of her 
decision.187 Moreover, even if the adjudicator were advised to consider 
such goals, her personal interest would be to continue rigid policing. A 
spy can be traced directly back to her, whereas the failure to achieve a 
broader agency objective has more diffuse culpability. 
Empirical evidence confirms that these perverse incentives bear out 
their expected consequences. As a caveat, there are obstacles to 
collecting reliable data. No agency publishes statistics related to its 
security clearance decisions and only one appeals board, DOHA, 
publishes its decisions.188 DOHA addresses contractors’ employees and 
 
 184. See supra note 157. 
 185. For a discussion of the third stage of the application process, see supra Part I. 
 186. 32 C.F.R. § 147.2. 
 187. For a discussion of the drawbacks of executive agencies, see supra Part III.A. 
 188. Cohen, supra note 45, at 8 n.25. 
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not all DoD cases. Nevertheless, its evidence demonstrates that appeals 
judges: 1) have a strong institutional bias against granting clearances in 
cases before them and 2) systematically deny or revoke the security 
clearances of candidates with foreign connections (that is, cases in which 
foreign influence or foreign preference challenges are raised against 
them). One study analyzed the 898 DOHA appeals decided between 
January 2000 and May 2006.189 It found that in cases in which the trial 
court had denied a clearance, candidates secured a reversal on appeal a 
mere 0.83 percent of the time, whereas the DoD prevailed in a stunning 
73.9 percent of cases it appealed.190 The disparity was even starker in 
foreign influence and foreign preference cases. In the 144 cases in which 
the trial court denied a clearance on the basis of either foreign influence 
or preference, the appeals board affirmed every time.191 In the forty-nine 
cases implicating the same issues in which the trial court granted a 
clearance and the DoD appealed, however, the appeals board affirmed 
only four decisions and reversed forty-five.192 Thus, the grim reality is 
that of the 193 appeals involving a candidate with a foreign relative or 
connection, the appeals board allowed a clearance to be granted in only 
four cases, each with atypical circumstances.193 
Given the appeals board’s limited scope of review, these disparate 
results simply cannot be reconciled with sound legal principles. For 
example, the forty-five reversals of decisions for the candidate on foreign 
influence or preference issues were originally decided by thirty-one 
different trial judges.194 As the author of the study, Sheldon Cohen, 
notes, the appeals board’s reasoning calls on observers to reach the 
improbable conclusion that these thirty-one different judges, who 
presumably have a grasp of the law and routinely apply it to varied fact 
patterns, all weighed the evidence in a manner that was “arbitrary, 
capricious, or contrary to law” in the 92 percent of cases in which they 
granted clearances, and yet competently weighed the evidence in 100 
percent of the foreign influence and foreign preference case in which 
they denied clearances.195 A more plausible interpretation is that appeals 
judges are following their perverse incentives and putting a legal gloss on 
an unstated policy of denying clearances to those with foreign ties. 
 
 189. Id. at 2. 
 190. Id. at 8. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 8–9. 
 194. Id. at 8. 
 195. Id. 
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Cohen indeed finds support for this proposition by cataloging the 
contorted legal reasoning appeals judges invoke to depart from 
precedent and deny clearances in many of the foreign influence and 
foreign preference cases. For example, to reverse a favorable 
determination, an appeals judge frequently will say that the trial judge 
used “piecemeal analysis” that amounted to being arbitrary or 
capricious.196 In one case, the trial judge granted a clearance to a 
candidate from Taiwan.197 The appeals board found that the correct legal 
standard was used, but because the trial judge mentioned that Taiwan 
was a friendly country to the United States without mentioning that 
sometimes friendly countries also engage in spying, the analysis was 
“piecemeal” and therefore arbitrary and capricious.198 Another device 
the appeals board employs is pointing to evidence in the record that the 
trial judge failed to consider—no matter how trivial—and then reversing 
the decision.199 In one case, the trial judge granted a clearance to a 
candidate from Iran, taking into consideration her country of origin and 
the fact that she “decided to leave Iran in order to pursue a life free of 
the dictatorship imposed by the ruling fundamentalist regime.”200 The 
appeals board reversed, finding that the judge failed to consider the 
“significant record evidence” that Iran is hostile to the United States, 
thereby rendering the decision an “arbitrary and capricious action.”201 
Importantly, however, Cohen points out that when the appeals board 
concurs with the outcome of a trial decision in which potentially key 
evidence is omitted, the appeals board will affirm, rationalizing that the 
omission was merely “harmless error.”202 The most frequently used 
device to deny a clearance to a candidate with family members living 
overseas is to require an impossible burden of proof.203 The primary 
 
 196. Id. at 28. 
 197. Id. (referencing ISCR Case No. 02-22461 (Defense Office of Hearing and Appeals Oct. 
27, 2005)). 
 198. Id. at 28–29 (referencing ISCR Case No. 02-22461). 
 199. See id. at 23–24 (citing the trivial failures of judges). 
 200. Id. at 24 (quoting ISCR Case No. 02-00318 (Defense Office of Hearing and Appeals 
Feb. 25, 2004)). 
 201. Id. at 26 (quoting ISCR Case No. 02-00318). Cohen appropriately notes that the 
appeals board’s reasoning presumes that the trial judge had not read a newspaper or an appeals 
board opinion concerning Iran in the last thirty years. Id. 
 202. Id. at 25 (referencing ISCR Case No. 02-02892 (Defense Office of Hearing and Appeals 
June 28, 2004) (ruling that the trial judge’s failure to consider that the candidate’s contacts with 
his Saudi Arabian family were sporadic was harmless error)). 
 203. Id. at 18 (“In case after case every variety of argument by an applicant has been 
rejected.”). 
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concern with family abroad is that a foreign agent could abduct and use 
them as leverage to coax classified information.204 DOHA has developed 
a rule that candidates prove the impossible and show not only that the 
family members had never been coerced by a foreign government in the 
past but that they would never be coerced in the future.205 Even if 
candidates can demonstrate that they are estranged from their overseas 
relatives206 or affirm that they are sufficiently loyal to the United States 
so as not to compromise national security out of self-interest,207 they will 
still lose. 
The problems of path dependency and tunnel vision are not easily 
correctable with internal agency reforms.208 First, path dependency, by its 
very definition, dictates that agencies hew to suboptimal courses of 
action merely because they are familiar. Second, it is difficult to imagine 
an internal restructuring that could escape the perverse incentives 
created by tunnel vision. As long as an agency official is the last to sign 
off on a security clearance, then that official’s incentive will be to over-
police the guiding criteria because a spy can be traced directly back to 
her, whereas the blame for failing to realize an agency objective is shared 
across the agency. The best way, then, to spur change and alter the 
incentive structure is for a judge, insulated from the agency’s culture, to 
look over the agency’s shoulder and correct its practices when they are 
inconsistent with the Constitution. 
3.  The Adverse Impact of Unchecked Agencies on the United 
States’ National Security.  The harms inflicted on national security by 
the status quo cannot be overstated. The bipartisan 9/11 Commission 
Report described a dire need to attract first- and second-generation 
Americans, particularly those with Arabic language skills and Middle 
 
 204. Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified 
Information, 32 C.F.R. § 147.4 (2008) (“Contacts with citizens of other countries or financial 
interests in other countries are also relevant to security determinations if they make an 
individual potentially vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure.”). 
 205. Cohen, supra note 45, at 18. 
 206. See supra note 157. 
 207. See ISCR Case No. 05-10108 (Defense Office of Hearing and Appeals June 22, 2006) 
(denying a security clearance to an applicant because of family members living overseas even 
though the adjudicator agreed he was “a loyal and trustworthy citizen of the U.S. who served in 
the Army with distinction”). 
 208. For a discussion of the drawbacks of executive agencies, see supra Part III.A. 
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Eastern cultural competency.209 At the time, the report pinned much 
of the blame on the cumbersome and primitive security clearance 
process.210 Today, Lee Hamilton, the vice chairman of the 
commission, laments the same lack of representation and the same 
obstacles, writing that “the better you know a critical language, 
culture, or people, the less likely you are to get a security 
clearance.”211 
The systematic exclusion of those with the relevant expertise 
impedes our operations and undercuts our legitimacy in the war on 
terror. It harms the country’s operations in three fundamental ways. 
First, agencies lack the diversity of agents necessary to gather human 
intelligence on terrorist organizations.212 Credibly penetrating and 
gathering intelligence on a pan-ethnic terrorist network like Al-Qaeda 
requires having a pan-ethnic workforce.213 Second, agencies lack the 
linguists to translate reams of intelligence that remain unparsed in 
languages like Arabic or Urdu.214 In 2006, for example, the Iraq Study 
Group reported that of the one thousand people working in the U.S. 
Embassy in Iraq, only thirty-three spoke Arabic and only six spoke it 
fluently.215 Third, the status quo perpetuates a law enforcement culture 
that privileges establishing guilt by association over the more difficult 
and important task of uncovering genuine terrorist threats to the 
 
 209. See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 91–92 (2004), available at http://www. 
9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf (enumerating the problems associated with lack of 
diversity in the intelligence community). 
 210. See id. at 92 (“Security concerns also increased the difficulty of recruiting officers 
qualified for counterterrorism. . . . Many who had traveled much outside the United States 
could expect a very long wait for initial clearance. Anyone who was foreign-born or had 
numerous relatives abroad was well-advised not even to apply.”). 
 211. Lee Hamilton, Intelligence Challenges Await Obama, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Dec. 29, 
2008, at A12. 
 212. See Frank Cilluffo, How Can the U.S. Improve Its Human Intelligence?, WASH. TIMES, 
July 6, 2008, at M11 (detailing how the lack of diversity and foreign language proficiency in the 
intelligence community prevents the United States from gathering human intelligence on Al-
Qaeda). 
 213. Id. 
 214. See Harry Levins, Supply of Arabic Students Falls Far Short of America’s Demand, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 13, 2004, at A1 (attributing to Heritage Foundation expert James 
Carafano the observation that intelligence agencies are “awash in untranslated gleanings of 
intelligence in Arabic”). 
 215. JAMES A. BAKER III ET AL., THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP REPORT 92 (2006) (“All of our 
efforts in Iraq, military and civilian, are handicapped by Americans’ lack of language and 
cultural understanding.”). 
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homeland.216 In the security clearance process, for example, expending 
scarce resources to ferret out tenuous associations and painstakingly 
policing Cold War decision points makes little sense, especially 
considering that the notorious spies have been those who began with 
clean records and good intentions but became disaffected and betrayed 
their country.217 
In addition to hurting national security in an operational sense, the 
current approach imputes disloyalty and breeds mistrust within 
communities that could provide needed intelligence.218 As stated, the 
current process needlessly excludes those with foreign connections in 
general and those with Middle Eastern backgrounds, language skills, and 
expertise in particular. Such exclusion undercuts the legitimacy of law 
enforcement efforts in relevant communities. As Professor David Cole 
has said, 
  One critical way to break down barriers is to employ members of 
the targeted community as law enforcement personnel. . . . [T]he 
presence in the ranks of law enforcement of individuals from 
targeted communities can open pathways of communication and 
 
 216. See David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV., 953, 986 (2002) (“If all one needs to 
prove is association, one need not do the difficult work of determining whether in fact the 
individuals are engaged in any criminal or terrorist activity.”). 
 217. COUNCIL ON SEC. & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, supra note 29, at 9. 
 218. An international legitimacy argument can be made as well. In a conventional war, the 
road to victory is paved by “kill[ing] or captur[ing] the enemy.” Ganesh Sitaraman, 
Counterinsurgency, the War on Terror, and the Laws of War, 95 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1747 (2009). 
In the war on terror, this “kill-capture” strategy is subordinated to a “win-the-population” 
strategy, which aims to win the hearts and minds of targeted populations and marginalize those 
who seek to destabilize legitimate political orders. See id. at 1765–70 (discussing the shift in the 
United States’ war on terror strategy from the “kill-capture” model to the “win-the-population” 
model). The domestic miscarriage of justice against those from critical communities can 
arguably tarnish the United States’ image as a preserver of human rights norms and the rule of 
law, handicapping the country’s ability to attract support from relevant international 
populations. See Peter K. Yu, Bridging the Digital Divide: Equality in the Information Age, 20 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 24 (2002) (noting that the United States’ “soft power,” or the 
ability to positively influence the behavior of other countries through the force of its values, is 
“derived from the appeal of ideas such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and 
individual freedom”). A similar phenomenon occurred in the early years of the Cold War. Then, 
the United States’ efforts to win hearts and minds in Asia, Africa, and South America met with 
stiff resistance as the Soviet Union tarnished the United States’ reputation by circulating court 
cases illustrating Jim Crow justice. MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND 
THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 12 (2000). 
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trust, as well as help law enforcement understand those 
communities’ needs and problems.219 
Just as the presence of individuals from targeted communities can 
foster trust, however, their absence or mistreatment can breed 
resentment.220 Consider the case of Moniem El-Ganayni, a naturalized 
citizen from Egypt, prison imam and Muslim community leader, and 
former nuclear scientist for the U.S. Department of Energy.221 The 
Middle Eastern and Muslim communities in Pittsburgh, where El-
Ganayni lived, probably respected the government for having El-
Ganayni work for it.222 There must have been shockwaves throughout 
the same communities223 when federal agents questioned his allegiance, 
summarily revoked his security clearance, terminated him, and denied 
him the right to even an agency appeal.224 “I will not live in this country 
as a second-class citizen,” he said after being denied an agency appeal.225 
The image of El-Ganayni and his wife losing the case in district court and 
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 223. See id. Farooq Husseini, director of interfaith relations at the Islamic Center, called 
government confrontations with El-Ganayni and another local imam “astonishing,” adding that 
“[t]hese are good men, very kind, very loyal. . . . If this can happen to them, it can happen to 
anybody.” Id. 
 224. See El-Ganayni v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, No. 2:08-cv-881, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88243, 
at *2–9 (W.D. Pa., Oct. 31, 2008) (describing the facts surrounding the case). The Department of 
Energy denied El-Ganayni an agency appeal pursuant to Executive Order 12,968 § 5.2(d). See 
El-Ganayni v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, No. 2:08-cv-881, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96220, at *2–3 
(W.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2008) (discussing the Department of Energy’s determination that the agency 
appeal process would not be made available to El-Ganayni). Executive Order 12,698 § 5.2(d) 
provides that a “particular procedure” related to the agency appeals process can be denied 
when the head of an agency or principal deputy personally certifies that allowing the procedure 
would “damage[] the national security interests of the United States by revealing classified 
information.” Exec. Order No. 12,968, 3 C.F.R. 391 (1995), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 435 (2006). 
 225. Kalson, supra note 221. 
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moving from Pittsburgh to Egypt after twenty-eight years in the United 
States likely will not fade easily.226 
IV.  REMEDIES 
The foregoing Parts have stressed the importance of preserving 
judicial review of security clearance determinations to vindicate 
constitutional injuries and provide the government with a diverse 
workforce capable of winning the war on terror. These concerns 
demand that courts discard their reliance on super-strong deference 
to the executive in foreign affairs, which denies a forum to plaintiffs 
raising constitutional claims of discrimination in relation to security 
clearance denials and revocations. Section A maps out how lower 
courts can, consistent with existing Supreme Court precedent, reopen 
independent judicial review of the merits of security clearance 
determinations to adjudicate a plaintiff’s equal protection constitutional 
claims. Section B suggests ways in which courts can then make these 
plaintiffs whole and deter future discriminatory agency rulings while 
avoiding a chilling effect on agency adjudicators. 
A.  A Roadmap for Courts of Appeals to Adjudicate the Merits of 
Security Clearance Determinations 
To escape the current trap of forum foreclosure, circuit courts 
can draw on the constitutional avoidance doctrine embedded in 
Webster.227 Indeed, lower courts in other contexts have relied on 
Webster to reopen judicial review and the option for Bivens claims 
when all other options have been foreclosed.228 Circuit courts would 
be on especially solid ground doing so here because Webster expressly 
permitted courts to reach the merits of security clearance 
determinations in relation to sexual orientation discrimination 
 
 226. See Sally Kalson, Muslim Physicist Leaves U.S. After Losing Security Clearance, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 28, 2008, at A1 (describing El-Ganayni’s departure and 
noting that he was “a respected member of the Muslim community, a founder of the Islamic 
Center of Pittsburgh who gave charity freely and moonlighted as a prison chaplain”). 
 227. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (invoking the constitutional avoidance 
canon to permit district courts to adjudicate a plaintiff’s constitutional claim arising from an 
adverse security clearance determination). For a description of the application of the 
constitutional avoidance canon when courts have seemingly been stripped of jurisdiction to review 
violations of individuals’ fundamental constitutional rights, see supra notes 68–76. 
 228. See supra note 107. 
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claims.229 It would be supremely puzzling for the Court to sanction 
such review in the case of homosexuals, but deny it in the case of 
racial minorities and other groups singled out by Congress for 
heightened protection. To reopen judicial review here, lower courts 
can find that Title VII does not preempt equal protection claims 
because of the serious constitutional doubts that would be raised by 
denying plaintiffs judicial review for colorable constitutional claims.230 
Once the merits are reached, a court would need to conduct an 
appropriate equal protection analysis to determine if the plaintiff is 
entitled to relief. Racial and national origin classifications trigger 
strict scrutiny review.231 If evidence can be presented that the 
administrative adjudicators employed facially discriminatory rules, 
such as in the DOHA decisions, then the government would need to 
demonstrate that the discrimination was for a compelling purpose and 
that the least discriminatory means were employed to achieve the 
purpose.232 Courts would likely find such rules as the irrebuttable 
presumption of proving that a foreign relative will never be coerced 
by a foreign government to be vastly overinclusive and therefore 
unconstitutional under a strict scrutiny analysis. 
If the lower courts do not want to altogether discard deference 
doctrines on matters touching foreign affairs, they can invoke an 
important distinction drawn in Hampton v. Wong.233 There, the Court 
distinguished between express mandates made in the foreign affairs 
arena by the president or Congress and those made by administrative 
agencies.234 The former receive only rational basis review, whereas the 
latter receive strict scrutiny.235 In Hampton, per this standard, the 
Court invalidated a Civil Service Commission internal regulation that 
required most civil service jobs to be filled by citizens, even though 
 
 229. See Webster, 486 U.S. at 603 (“Nothing in § 102(c) persuades us that Congress meant to 
preclude consideration of colorable constitutional claims arising out of the actions of the 
Director [of the CIA] pursuant to that section . . . .”). 
 230. For a description of how construction of Title VII contributes to forum foreclosure for 
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 231. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283–84 (1986) (plurality 
opinion) (invalidating a school board’s program permitting preferential treatment for blacks 
against layoffs). 
 232. See id. at 280–82 (laying out this rule governing contemporary equal protection 
jurisprudence). 
 233. Hampton v. Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976). 
 234. See id. at 105 (observing that presidential or congressional enactments are entitled to a 
presumption of validity that executive agencies do not receive). 
 235. Id. 
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the agency invoked foreign affairs interests such as providing an 
incentive for aliens to naturalize.236 Had the law been made through 
executive order or statute, however, it would have been considered 
constitutional.237 
Although tracking Hampton would be less than ideal from the 
theoretical perspective of a court whose imperative is to safeguard 
individual rights from political branch abuse, it nevertheless would 
likely lead to the same outcome as a blanket strict scrutiny rule. After 
all, it would trigger strict scrutiny of the agency regulation, which 
accordingly would be declared unconstitutional. Once so declared, it 
would seem highly unlikely for the political branches to expressly 
require that adjudicators employ the discriminatory standards, such 
as those pervading DOHA decisions. 
B.  Making Plaintiffs Whole, Deterring Future Discrimination, and 
Avoiding a Chilling Effect 
After declaring the discriminatory rule unconstitutional, lower 
courts would have to determine the remedy necessary to make the 
plaintiff before them whole. Professor Walter Dellinger provided a 
useful distinction between using the Constitution as a “shield” and as 
a “sword” to fashion remedies for constitutional violations.238 To use it 
as a shield is to block the government from causing injury, using 
equitable or injunctive relief to neutralize impermissible government 
behavior.239 To use it as a sword, which the Court explicitly did for the 
first time in Bivens, is to employ it for an affirmative purpose, finding 
a cause of action directly under the Constitution.240 Working within 
the current web of Supreme Court precedent, lower courts can and 
should feel free to employ both remedies when confronted with 
colorable equal protection claims arising out of an adverse security 
clearance determination. 
 
 236. See id. at 116 (“[A]ssuming without deciding that the national interests identified by the 
petitioners would adequately support an explicit determination by Congress or the President to 
exclude all noncitizens from the federal service, we conclude that those interests cannot provide 
an acceptable rationalization for such a determination . . . .”). 
 237. See id. at 105 (“We may assume with the petitioners that if the Congress or the 
President had expressly imposed the citizenship requirement, it would be justified by the 
national interest in providing an incentive for aliens to become naturalized . . . .”). 
 238. Dellinger, supra note 20, at 1532. 
 239. See id. (describing his theory of the use of the Constitution as a shield against 
government action). 
 240. See id. at 1532–33 (describing his theory of the use of the Constitution as a sword in 
Bivens). 
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In most instances, a shield remedy of remanding the case back to 
the agency with instructions to apply nondiscriminatory standards 
would suffice. It is possible to envision, however, an instance when an 
equitable remedy would be insufficient. Say, for example, that a 
Kurdish linguist translating intelligence from Northern Iraq had her 
security clearance revoked in February 2009 solely because of her 
national origin and is then terminated. In the time between her 
termination and trial two years later, a phased withdrawal from Iraq 
commenced and intelligence operations in Northern Iraq were scaled 
back, so that her old position no longer exists. As a result, a shield 
remedy would not suffice for the Kurdish linguist because there is no 
position for the agency to return her to. Instead, it would be 
“damages or nothing” as it was for the plaintiff in Bivens.241 The case 
would be analogous to Davis v. Passman,242 in which the Court held 
that damages were available as a remedy to a congressman’s female 
employee because in the time between commencing her employment 
discrimination claim and receiving a ruling, the Congressman lost his 
seat and therefore she could not be reinstated to her old position.243 
Under a Bivens action, the federal officers responsible for the 
constitutional violation are held personally liable for causing injury.244 
In this case, then, the adjudicators revoking her clearance would be 
held liable. Generally, however, executive officials are entitled to 
qualified immunity and protected from liability for civil damages 
when performing discretionary functions.245 Thus, it would be 
exceedingly difficult to recover from the federal officers here. 
Moreover, there is the possibility that forcing the agency adjudicators 
to personally pay could produce a chilling effect in which they avoid 
issuing adverse security clearance determinations out of fear of losing 
their salary.246 Alternatively, then, the plaintiff could take the cause of 
action arising directly under the Constitution and pair it with a 
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statutory back-pay remedy.247 The cause of action would track Bivens, 
but the remedy, rather than coming from the pockets of adjudicators, 
would come from the federal government vis-à-vis the Back Pay Act, 
which ensures recompense for “unjustified or unwarranted personnel 
action [that] has resulted in the withdrawal or reduction of all or part 
of the pay.”248 This approach would overcome qualified immunity 
defenses and avoid punishing adjudicators financially, which could 
potentially have a chilling effect. 
Reopening a Bivens cause of action could also reshape agency 
norms. By making pronouncements on the rule of law and especially 
the Constitution, the judiciary wields influence through social norms. 
As Professor Richard Primus has said, “[J]udicial articulation of a 
system of constitutional values in which racial discrimination is 
reprehensible might shape the normative atmosphere in which 
government officials act, making them less likely to want to 
discriminate in the first place.”249 Thus, the prospect of censure by 
Article III judges could compel agency adjudicators to examine the 
motives underlying their determinations, to recalibrate those motives 
to accord with the Constitution, and to provide candidates from 
critical communities with fairer hearings.250 Even if individual 
adjudicators’ attitudes fail to change, judicial pronouncement of 
constitutional values could alert an adjudicator’s coworkers and 
superiors that a fundamental change in culture is needed, fostering 
agency attitudes and norms likely to serve as a deterrent for 
discriminatory actions. 
CONCLUSION 
Writing in the wake of Bivens nearly forty years ago, Professor 
Walter Dellinger praised the way that the Court had finally used the 
Constitution as a sword, piercing sovereign immunity to fashion 
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appropriate remedies for the violation of individual rights.251 In the 
intervening years, the judiciary has all too often retreated, abdicating 
its duty to safeguard civil liberties, particularly when the executive 
branch invokes national security and expects due deference.252 In the 
context of security clearances, Egan’s declaration of super-strong 
deference to the executive in foreign affairs compelled lower courts to 
deny plaintiffs a forum for bringing constitutional claims related to 
racial discrimination in the security clearance process. This abdication 
has reinforced, rather than checked, executive agency incompetence. 
As a consequence, the judiciary has enabled a systematic denial of 
clearances to candidates with foreign connections, depriving the 
United States of the operational proficiency and the legitimacy to 
wage a successful war on terror. This Note has presented a roadmap 
for lower courts to change course by reopening judicial review of the 
merits of security clearance determinations, making injured plaintiffs 
whole, deterring future racial discrimination, and avoiding a chilling 
effect on agency adjudicators. 
In short, to reclaim its role in the United States’ system of 
separation of powers, the judiciary should not use the Constitution to 
make peace with the political branches of government, but rather, 
should wield it as a sword. 
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